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How do we build a robust, comprehensive future of nonviolence in the Catholic Church? First, I 
will explore how a Catholic commitment to nonviolence as a “style of politics for peace” could 
function to orient and transform military institutions as we begin to re-imagine protection 
mechanisms. Second, in this re-imagining I will draw on a Eucharistic orientation for an inquiry 
into actual and possible nonviolent protection mechanisms in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Third, 
in order to create more space for such nonviolence, I will respond briefly to some recent 
scholarship that critiques my thinking on the just war framework. My core argument is that if the 
Catholic Church commits to offering a sacramental imagination of nonviolence to the world, then 
we will more effectively transform military institutions toward trans-armament and offer more 
credible nonviolent forms of defense.  
The recent trajectory of the Catholic Church has been steadily moving toward a more robust 
affirmation of active nonviolence. The power of active nonviolence in many or most conflict 
situations is often affirmed by scholars who argue for the continued use of just war thinking. 
Militaries themselves increasingly recognize their own limits and the need for more nonviolent 
strategies. Recognizing the good faith of conscientious and stringent just war thinkers, I want to 
begin here by building on some of what we have in common as we transform the Church together. 
My primary purpose in this essay, therefore, is to lay out a thought experiment imagining what it 
would look like for Catholics working to transform the world’s militaries according to a just peace 
ethic.  
A quick summary of the just peace ethic I am referring to includes: (1) developing virtues and 
skills to engage conflict constructively through spiritual disciplines, key virtues,1 nonviolent 
education and skills, participatory processes, and the formation of nonviolent peacemaking 
communities; (2) breaking cycles of violence via reflexivity (i.e., keeping means and ends 
consistent), re-humanization, conflict transformation and dialogue, nonviolent direct action, and 
integral disarmament, and the acknowledgement of responsibility for harm2; (3) building 
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sustainable peace through relationality and reconciliation, robust civil society and just governance, 
respect for human dignity and rights, ecological sustainability, as well as economic, racial, and 
gender justice.3  
 
A Nonviolent Just Peace Ethic: Transforming the Military Institution 
If the Catholic Church develops its official teaching on nonviolence, how would a just peace ethic 
enable Catholic advocates to impact and transform military institutions? The “nonviolent horizon,” 
grammar, or logic of this ethic includes the outlawing and ending of war.4 However, as we 
transition in ways consistent with and toward this horizon, this ethic can better enable military 
institutions to take key transformative steps. 
This ethical orientation would draw the military community to increasingly speak out and 
directly advocate for growing investment, resources, and strategic commitments to nonviolent 
approaches. For example, this might include promoting a normative shift for governments to a 
“right to assist” nonviolent resistance campaigns as central for preventing mass atrocities.5 It is 
often said that the military community is the most reluctant to engage in war, so to the degree there 
is truth in that claim this ethic will better enable such tendencies. 
In the area of strategic doctrine, the just peace ethic encourages the military community to 
change core strategic questions toward: how to engage conflict well, how to break cycles of 
violence, and how to cultivate the conditions for sustainable peace. Engaging conflict well, i.e., 
constructively rather than destructively, orients the military to help identify root causes and key 
needs of all actors, cultivate virtuous habits, as well as engage in intersectional, racial, and gender 
analysis of conflicts. Breaking cycles of violence rather than focusing on winning wars allows the 
military to re-humanize adversaries, to transform conflicts rather than merely end them, to better 
acknowledge responsibility for harm done, to turn adversaries into future partners, and to 
increasingly practice reflexivity, i.e., using means consistent with ends. Such reflexivity is crucial 
to considering how to contribute to rather than obstruct the conditions for sustainable peace. Rather 
than mere stability, this shift to a lens of sustainable peace enables the military to at least not 
obstruct environmental and structural justice, to step back and enable space for civil society, and 
to make clear commitments to outlaw and end war, not simply to avoid crimes during war.  
The U.S. Army Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies Field Manual provides an example of 
how the seeds of some just peace norms are already present and ripe for further development.6 For 
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example, the authors use the term “generational engagement” and relations between the population 
and government to identify how peacebuilding, or the norms of dialogue and relationality, can be 
actualized at all stages of conflict, even in high threat situations.7 They also explicitly point to the 
norm of participation regarding youth and civil society. The manual identifies the norm of 
sustainability and attending to root causes as in its discussion of economic development plans as 
well as the importance of defections. In a more indirect way, it refers to the pillars of support, 
which are key to strategic nonviolent resistance. These include “land reform” and “debt” as 
examples of the material resources pillar.8  
However, the authors of the Field Manual do not actualize the norm of participation because 
they exclude adversaries or “enemies” whom they intend to “isolate” or destroy.9 They also fail 
the norm of nonviolent skillsets by excluding a needs-based analysis. Instead of simply seeking to 
“isolate” the enemy or hope they lose “desire,” counterinsurgents could identify the enemy’s 
deeper needs and devise strategies that draw them toward these needs. Some of these needs might 
be respect for self and religion, livelihood, meaning, connection, effectiveness, inspiration, etc. 
This would also be essential to stimulating and sustaining adequate defections. Furthermore, the 
Field Manual does not actualize the norm of sustainability since counterinsurgents are not 
attending adequately to environmental damage of their military training and engagements. Their 
indirect references to strategic nonviolent action are insufficient since their present methodology 
is too saturated with cultural and direct violence. In turn, a nonviolent just peace ethic would 
identify and cultivate these seeds for potential growth, but would not signal moral legitimation of 
cultural, structural, or direct violence.  
Building on this approach, this ethic would enable the military to construct new pilot programs. 
For example, drawing on their stated commitments to protection, this ethic invites and challenges 
them to pilot an unarmed protection unit. The proven practice of unarmed civilian protection 
(UCP) by international organizations, such as the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP), Peace Brigades 
International, and Cure Violence, can serve as models and resources for such a pilot. For instance, 
in South Sudan, Nonviolent Peaceforce’s protection units, which engage all armed actors, has 
reduced sexual assaults and rape by armed actors from regularity to zero in the areas NP patrols 
and directly saved fourteen people from an armed militia attack. This attack was occurring in a 
U.N. protection site. As people were running and being shot, fourteen women and children rushed 
into a mud hut with two NP officers. Three different times, the armed militia came in demanding 
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that the NP officers leave, but each time they refused, saying they were unarmed, non-partisan, 
and humanitarian. Amazingly, the fourteen women and children survived the deadly attack. One 
of the NP officers said, “If we had a gun we would’ve been shot immediately; so without arms we 
can find other ways.”10 In addition, there are instructive examples from other militaries, such as 
the Australian Department of Defense.11 Further, the U.N., including the Department of 
Peacekeeping, already has some unarmed elements in their deployments and is increasingly 
endorsing this methodology more formally and broadly, even at the U.N. Security Council.12  
Some might wonder if this would make soldiers less secure and less capable of protecting 
others. This is an important concern. However, much of this dynamic depends on what else the 
government or other parts of their military is doing. For example, if the government of this 
unarmed protection unit is enacting crippling sanctions on the people, extracting resources, de-
humanizing the leaders, and even bombing other parts of the country, then such a unit will be much 
less secure, and their protection impact will be impeded but not necessarily insignificant. A key 
characteristic of unarmed protection is being and working with credible messengers in the social 
context. Hence, civil society organizations are more often much better positioned to offer unarmed 
protection. Nevertheless, if the destructive actions mentioned above and other similar approaches 
are absent, such unarmed programs would enable persons in the military to build better trust with 
key stakeholders on the ground, to gather more credible intelligence to prevent violence, to better 
de-escalate destructive conflicts, to create more space for nonviolent civil society leaders and 
campaigns, to displace less communities and refugees, and, thus, to ultimately protect more people 
over the long-term.13 As lessons are learned from the pilot programs, potential shifting of military 
resources as well as expansion in partnerships and types of conflict situations can ensue.  
Furthermore, drawing on the just peace norms and the military’s stated commitment to defense, 
advocates could promote a pilot program in nonviolent civilian-based defense (CBD) as some 
countries have done. Nonviolent CBD entails using nonviolent resistance to defend against 
military invasion, occupation, or coups d’état. For instance, the resistors do not necessarily 
physically prevent invading troops from entering their territory. At the same time, most people in 
some way participate in the resistance, taking more responsibility for their own defense rather than 
simply delegating it to an elite group.14 This primarily entails strategic noncooperation with some 
orders from the opponent and perhaps the creation of parallel institutions or government, to the 
point of making it inconvenient to nearly impossible for the occupying force to benefit or even 
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remain. When such a large-scale, coordinated nonviolent refusal to resource the opponent’s 
governing ambitions is clearly demonstrated in advance, some opponents may even be deterred 
from an attack in the first place.15 
Nonviolent CBD has taken different forms and been developed a number of times in the past 
century, and some governments recently incorporated it into their defense planning. Past examples 
include the 1923 resistance to Wolfgang Kapp’s attempted coup d’état in Germany, the Norwegian 
and Danish resistance against German occupation during World War II, the Czechoslovakian 
resistance against Soviet occupation in 1968, the People Power Revolution in the Philippines in 
1986, the drive for independence in the Baltic countries in 1990–1991, and Russians preventing 
the Soviet coup attempt in 1991.16 Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, and Lithuania have incorporated 
CBD into their defense planning by providing research and development funds to create nonviolent 
methods to prevent military occupation.17  
Others have written about such a strategy from a Gandhian perspective, or more recently, as a 
way to counter Russian hybrid warfare.18 For instance, Robert J. Burrows, drawing on Gandhi, 
explains that any CBD approach must not rely too much on elites and limited system reform. Any 
form of “nonviolent defense” should assist civil society organizers and ordinary people in their 
struggle to satisfy human needs.19 Orienting such defense toward identification with all humans 
will decrease fear and create more space for the necessary courage for nonviolent defense.20 Key 
tactical elements would include more dispersion than concentration, contingency plans, advance 
personal contact with opposing troops to reduce their fears and counter any de-humanization of 
the occupied population, the generation of resistance or defections in such troops, and the alteration 
of the will of key social groups in the domestic constituencies of the opponent’s elite or those in 
allied countries. Nonviolent CBD is less likely to produce significant casualties in part because it 
can foster a more trusting political climate, less threatening physical circumstances, and a 
reduction in negative emotional states as well as increased humanization.21 Much more study and 
experimentation can and should be done in this area. A nonviolent just peace ethic will better 
explore and sustain such transformation of defense approaches.  
However, the transformation of overall military strategy and structural programs can only go 
so far unless formation is significantly addressed. A just peace ethic would form people to enter 
more nonviolent institutions and careers; however, it could also considerably enhance the 
formation of all persons who otherwise end up in the military. One of the key issues in military 
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training is the de-humanization of adversaries in order to increase the willingness of soldiers to 
kill. Yet, this de-humanization of others also contributes to the de-humanization of the soldiers 
themselves, such as through displacement of responsibility and decreasing empathy.22 The just 
peace norm of re-humanization as well as the norm of dignity and human rights would challenge 
this intentional strategy to de-humanize others. It would also supplement this with formation in 
key just peace virtues such as compassion, humility, and empathy.23 Will this make soldiers much 
less willing to kill? Yes. But it will also enhance critical thinking, emotional intelligence, and habits 
of creative, nonviolent actions to sustainably accomplish legitimate objectives that a defense 
institution may have. 
This ethic will also help us recognize that killing itself distorts and violates our human dignity. 
The advancing scientific acknowledgement of trauma, perpetrator induced syndrome, moral injury, 
and brain damage from killing illustrate this reality.24 Thus, the just peace ethic enables a deepening 
and clarifying of the virtue of courage to the practice of suffering out of reverence for the dignity 
of others (and self) by risking, perhaps even giving one’s life, without killing. Although it may be 
a dilemma to refuse to kill in difficult, rare situations, human flourishing and just peace norms, 
especially virtues, dignity, and the ever-surprising, creative dynamics unleashed by nonviolent 
action, draw us to risk life rather than to take life, especially if we are Christian. Pope John Paul II 
called us “not to follow those who train us in how to kill,” because “violence destroys our 
dignity.”25 Pope Francis said, “The commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill’ has absolute value, and 
concerns both the innocent and the guilty, and even criminals maintain the inviolable right to life, 
the gift of God.”26 
In turn, a just peace ethic can cultivate healthier action choices and tactics by military personnel 
when they operate in conflict zones. A just peace ethic can cultivate healthier action choices and 
tactics by military personnel when they operate in conflict zones. Several common military actions 
will not meet the just peace norms, but soldiers could strive towards these norms and, at a 
minimum, make much less harmful choices. Nonetheless, Catholics and other just peace advocates 
would maintain high standards. For instance, bombing a set of tanks or armed vehicles with 
military persons in them during a war might be less distance from the just peace norms than 
bombing a hospital. It may be “less harmful,” but it would not satisfy the just peace norms, and 
thus would not be considered morally justified.27 Just peace advocates would instead promote a 
broad set of creative, nonviolent actions. In contrast, a just war framework could describe such an 
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action as morally justified, and thus perpetuate supporting components (structural violence, 
cultural violence, cycles of direct violence, “collateral damage,” etc.) that normally attend such 
choices. 
But, more importantly, Catholics would call persons in the military to actions during violent 
conflict which are in accord with the just peace norms. Soldiers have prior experiences with these 
alternatives and would be more inclined to pursue them. For example, some soldiers do talk with 
respect and empathy to the people they encounter, such as ordinary civilians, in a violent conflict 
zone. Some soldiers do include local people in some decision-making about how to proceed in a 
community. Some do help build schools, electric grids, bridges, houses, etc. Some do converse 
deeply with enemies or prisoners and develop some empathy. Some do try to avoid harming 
essential, life-giving infrastructure. Some do stay back and let local nonviolent resistance 
campaigns have social space. Some do advocate for governments to invest more in peacebuilding 
and diplomacy not only before but during violent conflict. Some do lay their weapons down when 
engaging with some individuals, families, or groups in order to build trust and lower the sense of 
threat. Some do transport internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugees to safety. The just 
peace ethic would enable these actions to happen much more often and give more moral 
legitimation for them as we sustainably transform both the conflict and the military institution at 
the same time. 
One might respond that such formation could be helpful, but soldiers still need to be trained 
and willing to kill in today’s militaries. Otherwise, how would militaries be an adequate threat to 
violent aggression? Or, how would they actually stop such violent aggression? There is solid 
empirical evidence to at least question if not considerably doubt the overall effectiveness of violent 
responses.28 However, my point here is that the role of Catholics, if not all Christians, is not to 
morally justify, legitimate, or label such killing necessary. For militaries, there is a domestic and 
international legal system in place which claims to permit, manage, and limit armed conflict. As 
we work to solidify a commitment to nonviolence in the Catholic community, there must also be 
persistent efforts to mainstream just peace norms in the legal system.29 This would include a clear 
commitment to outlaw and end war. Thus, as part of the transformation of military institutions, we 
can increasingly reduce and perhaps at some point root out their killing. However, the role of 
Catholics, and perhaps all Christians, would shift to a nonviolent just peace ethic to guide our 
actions and to gradually but steadily transform the military.30 
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This transition process is oriented by a commitment to trans-armament, i.e., the process of 
preparing a society structurally and culturally to move from a military-based defense to a 
nonviolent civilian-based defense. Pope Francis uses the term “integral disarmament” to refer to 
the internal disarmament of our hearts, sensibilities, and habits as well as the external disarmament 
of weapons and militaries. While Catholics work to transform military institutions from within as 
one key line of effort, an essential complementary part will be for the Catholic Church to work 
outside military institutions to build on these nonviolent practices, such as unarmed civilian 
protection and nonviolent civilian-based defense, as their own models in our communities and 
countries. This will be necessary for militaries to “see” what is going on around them and the 
impact these practices can have to motivate their own internal transformations. The Catholic 
community has significant resources and institutions to do this work, especially in coalition with 
other religious or civil society organizations. There is a broad network of educational institutions 
that can do the research and consistently teach the upcoming generations. There is major convening 
power of the Vatican and other Catholic institutions to bring key stakeholders together. There are 
significant advocacy institutions in the Vatican’s diplomatic corps, national Bishops’ conferences, 
and religious/lay advocacy organizations. I sense that Catholics have an urgent call to scale-up 
local peace teams that offer unarmed civilian protection, as well as the international UCP 
organizations that deploy to conflict zones. These include especially the Nonviolent Peaceforce, 
Cure Violence, Peace Brigades International, Christian Peacemaker Teams, and Operation Dove. 
Catholics can support and pilot more nonviolent civilian-defense programs in towns, cities, 
countries, and internationally.  
It is crucial for Catholics to attend to these creative, nonviolent practices of protection and 
national defense as we see similar trends in international relations scholarship. For instance, 
Richard Jackson explains that “it is more likely that in employing violence to protect a group of 
innocent people in the present, the long-term effects will be to reinforce the discourses and 
psychological mechanisms that encourage future resorts to violence and the entrenchment of an 
ongoing cycle of violence, thus perpetuating rather than relieving the suffering of the innocent.”31 
As Catholics reflect on the more general need to protect all life in the context of salvation history, 
we might more clearly envision healthy protection mechanisms through the lens of the Eucharist. 
The Eucharist is God’s expression through Jesus of nonviolent love, risking and offering life for 
others without killing. Jesus risks his life to save and protect us from the ultimate death of being 
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disconnected from God, and thus models for us ultimate and sustainable protection. When we 
participate in the Eucharist, we are empowered and called to embody this kind of risking of life 
for others. This represents Jesus’s saving work to the world and thus draws us all further into the 
way of salvation, which is the authentic protection of our lives and the illumination of our sacred 
dignity. “In the silence of the Cross, the uproar of weapons ceases and the language of 
reconciliation, forgiveness, dialogue and peace is spoken.”32 With this focus on risking of life 
without killing, Catholics would promote the saving of every life as the constitutive orientation for 
any institutional mechanism focused on protection.33  
 
An Inquiry into the Rwandan Genocide 
Such a Eucharistic orientation toward protection approaches would increase our attentiveness, 
open our imagination, and deepen our commitment to creative, nonviolent initiatives even in 
highly difficult situations. I will not provide a full analysis of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, but 
I will reflect briefly on this case with this Eucharistic orientation and a nonviolent just peace ethic 
to draw out a few reference points for further consideration. 
One of the first steps in such an inquiry is to become adequately aware of the root causes of the 
horrible spike in violence that occurred in April 1994 in Rwanda. The just peace norms of 
nonviolent skills and conflict transformation includes such an analysis. Like many conflicts in 
Africa, this one has roots in the violent habits formed through colonialism. For example, Paul 
Kagame, the present President of Rwanda, grew up in nearby Uganda after his parents fled Hutu 
violence in 1959 during Rwanda’s struggle for independence from colonial rule. Later, he joined 
an armed group in Uganda which deposed its president. Shortly afterwards, in the late 1980s he 
and other Tutsi leaders plotted the overthrow of the Hutu government in Rwanda. Meanwhile, the 
French had been the political, economic, and military supporters of the Hutu government, 
particularly in the early 1990s. In 1990, Kagame studied at the U.S. Army Command College in 
Kansas. After a failed attack by the Rwandan Patriotic Front on the Hutu government, Kagame 
soon became the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).  
These attacks continued on and off in the early 1990s, with various attempts at negotiations. 
The French support and presence of military forces empowered hardline Hutu elements to continue 
their violence (including the killing of civilians) and propaganda, and ultimately the intense spike 
in bloodshed known as the 1994 genocide. Meanwhile, U.S. and Ugandan support for the RPF and 
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Kagame perpetuated their ongoing campaign of violence, which stoked the fear of ordinary Hutus 
and enabled the success of their propaganda to attack Tutsis more broadly. Both France and the 
U.S. had many points along this violent conflict cycle when they could have pressured their 
proxies, withdrawn economic/political/military support, mitigated the violence, and ultimately 
prevented or defused the genocide. For instance, French banks were instead complicit in 
transferring funds for the Rwandan government during the genocide.34 The citizens of these 
democratic countries also had opportunities to influence their governments to pursue more positive 
strategies. The just peace norms of reflexivity (consistency of means and ends) and just governance 
would be particularly helpful to stimulate such activity. 
For example, both the Hutu political and military sectors as well as the Tutsi-dominated RPF 
were clearly starting to train and mobilize civilians to use arms against the civilians of the 
adversary. This began in late 1990 for the Hutus as a “self-defense” operation along with more 
formally trained militias. The RPF also did this, especially in early 1994 before the genocide. After 
the assassination of Rwanda’s Hutu president on April 6, 1994, which followed the October 1993 
assassination of Burundi’s Hutu president, there was another clear moment for potential nonviolent 
intervention. Within the next twenty-four hours key moderate Hutu leaders, including the prime 
minister, were killed by the government’s armed forces. These figures were central levers for 
maintaining previous negotiations.35 
As the killing again escalated, France evacuated French citizens but also evacuated high-
ranking Rwandan government officials from the regime involved in the killings while refusing to 
evacuate Tutsis, even those who worked at the French embassy.36 Likewise, other Western 
countries, including the U.S., evacuated their own citizens and generally refused to evacuate 
Tutsis. However, if the just peace norm of human rights and human dignity was followed, hundreds 
if not thousands of Tutsis and others could have been saved.  
Another key driver of the killing was the de-humanizing propaganda, which is common to all 
wars and violates the just peace norm of re-humanization. In this case, the Rwandan government, 
military, and other Hutus used the radio to condition and exacerbate the killing of Tutsis.37 Another 
plausible and meaningful nonviolent intervention would have been to cut off that radio signal. The 
U.S. Department of Defense considered this but chose against it primarily due to respecting 
national “sovereignty.” This sort of propaganda and other types of rumor-spreading before and 
during the 1994 genocide was key to creating fear and the willingness to kill. Notable examples 
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are known of intentional rumor-spreading by officials leading to civilians killing other civilians 
even back in 1990.38  
A proven practice for dispelling rumors and preventing them from causing or escalating 
violence is the practice of unarmed civilian protection, which fits the just peace norm of nonviolent 
direct action. Organizations like Peace Brigades International and Nonviolent Peaceforce use UCP 
to generate trust and lines of communications with all actors. This practice could have been 
implemented to mitigate and prevent the spreading of deadly rumors before and during the 1994 
genocide.39 This would have been particularly pivotal after the assassination of the president. 
Furthermore, at times this practice can also offer direct protection, especially for civilians. As 
mentioned above, two Nonviolent Peaceforce officers directly protected fourteen women and 
children during an armed militia attack at a U.N. compound in South Sudan. We also know of this 
spontaneously happening in Rwanda, whether it was some courageous Hutus protecting Tutsis, 
such as Hutu Muslims using mosques40 and the story of Hotel Rwanda, or the Catholic sisters of 
the Missionaries of Charity who protected many Tutsi children.41 These were the kinds of 
nonviolent actions that could have been better resourced, coordinated, and promoted by key 
governments like the U.S. and France but also by civil society leaders within and outside Rwanda. 
For instance, too many Catholic leaders in Rwanda who were credible messengers in their 
community failed to offer such unarmed protection, and even at times enabled and directly 
participated in the killing.42 A number of such key social groups could have been strategically 
engaged to join in nonviolent defense and noncooperation to reduce the violence.43  
Meanwhile, Kagame’s RPF, which appeared to play a key role in ending this genocide, was 
still involved in massive human rights violations before, during, and after the 1994 genocide. 
Foreign Policy journalist James Traub describes, as a “typical episode,” the RPF  
 
kidnapped refugees, many of them women and children, and brought them to a 
camp, allegedly under the pretext of returning them to Rwanda. The refugees were 
then brought out in small groups. From the report: “They were bound and their 
throats were cut or they were killed by hammer blows to the head. Their bodies 
were then thrown into pits or doused with petrol and burned. The operation was 
carried out in a methodical manner and lasted at least one month.”44 
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Although the genocide of 1994 seemed to subside, the cycles of horrendous violence which pre-
dated the genocide were mostly simply displaced and continued afterwards, particularly moving 
into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where the carnage continues even today. Of course, 
access to Congo’s rich supply of minerals offers an economic boon to Western companies, 
especially from the U.S. Hence, most analysts recognize the connection between Kagame’s 
military training in the U.S., his violent expansion into the DRC, and the economic interests of the 
U.S. in that region.45 Protection of all life certainly has not been the primary, if even a significant 
driver in the responses to violence by this collection of armed actors. 
This brief inquiry into the Rwandan genocide illuminates the critical contributions of a 
Eucharistic orientation to protection and a nonviolent just peace ethic. At minimum, it 
complexifies a situation that is often portrayed as a binary choice between violent intervention and 
being a bystander to genocide. Furthermore, it better illuminates that violence which appears 
“justified” or “humanitarian” to some still leads to indefensible, ongoing cycles of bloodshed. But, 
more importantly, the Eucharistic orientation and just peace ethic offers analytical methods, norms, 
and creative, nonviolent protection mechanisms that we may miss or under-value. For Catholic 
advocates and even those Catholics in government, this invites and challenges us to better commit 
and focus on these alternatives. The institutional Church and Catholic advocacy organizations have 
a critical opportunity to fully embody and offer to the world this sacramental imagination of 
nonviolence. In some rare situations of extreme difficulty, it may not be appropriate for Catholics 
to morally critique certain actors who may resort to violent protection, including “lethal force.” 
But rather than being a voice of justification, legitimation, or endorsement of violence, this is a 
call to focus our formation, discernment, resources, advocacy, intervention, and bodies to 
accompany such persons toward creative, nonviolent approaches that prevent and defuse violent 
conflict even in such difficult situations. 
 
Recent Discourse on Just War 
In order to create more space for such nonviolence, I will respond briefly to some scholarship 
referencing my arguments related to a just war framework. I have discussed some of my concerns 
about the just war approach in a previous Expositions essay.46 Here I would like to clarify some of 
this thinking and address some subsequent arguments on this topic in order to further shed light 
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on the need to move us closer to the Catholic Church fully embodying and offering to the world a 
sacramental imagination of nonviolence. 
In my previous article, I identified the concern about how the just war criteria have mostly been 
used to justify rather than prevent or limit war. There appears to be considerable agreement about 
this, even from perspectives that still uphold the just war concept.47 However, some of these same 
supporters have gone so far to claim that I and others fail to see how just war theory has been used 
to argue against war and to restrain war.48 They further suggest that since it has been used in this 
way, then this legitimates the ongoing use and refinement of just war theories. 
Yet, I and others have previously said that the just war criteria have “mostly” or “too often” 
been used, not always been used, to justify rather than prevent or limit war.49 I recognize that some 
scholars, religious leaders, and political leaders have drawn on just war criteria to speak out against 
a particular war or actions in war.50 However, even though this happens, it still primarily has 
functioned to create the social conditions for the likelihood of war and to endorse wars. Hence, I 
have quoted Bishop McElroy, who said the “just war principles have become only a little bit less 
than a green light” for war.51 Further, Gerald Schlabach has argued that “just war cannot be counted 
as useful if it only works consistently among specialists, and not to mobilize stringent scrutiny of 
warfare in pews and populace.” Just war theorists, he goes on, “must [...] recognize the theory’s 
failure to help the people of God scrutinize and resist unjust war.”52 He responds directly to 
scholars who argue that the misuse of something is no argument against its proper use: 
 
[this] principle […] is simply not convincing as applied to the just war theory. For 
in order to override both the plain words of Jesus and early Christian scruples 
against all bloodshed, and to justify exceptional recourse to violence in order to 
prevent more violence, the best and perhaps only argument has always been some 
claim of greater realism. But as I argued, the persistent manipulation of just war 
discourse is itself a data point concerning reality, a “hard fact” with which its 
advocates must grapple far more. To evade such grappling by insisting it could still 
work in theory is something of a bait-and-switch.53 
 
In other words, they argue that just war is a necessary concession to the reality of the human 
condition in a so-called fallen world, i.e., it would work better than the alternatives, but then they 
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appeal to its value as an ideal. This is a bait-and-switch: it is either realistic or it isn’t.54 The strong 
evidence of consistent abuse over time to the ad bellum and in bello criteria has led to enormous, 
ongoing, and unacceptable consequences for countless people and the earth.55 In addition to the 
reality that the just peace ethic could better prevent and limit war, as some had hoped the just war 
tradition would adequately do,56 these tragic realities significantly de-legitimate this moral 
framework as an official teaching in the Catholic Church, even if some specialists try to use it 
primarily to speak out against war.  
In addition to a pattern of enabling direct violence, the just war approach too often functions to 
enable structural and cultural violence, as I alluded to briefly in my previous essay.57 A moral 
framework focused on whether violence is morally legitimate, even in a restricted form, too often 
enables governments to expend significant energy on preparing to win a possible “just war” rather 
than invest in nonviolent resources or other basic human needs. This structural violence often 
includes the arms trade and a war system increasingly embedded in our economy and politics. 
Also, this ethic frequently enables cultural violence in the form of de-humanizing social habits 
generated by training for war, media propaganda to support preparation for war, and generational 
trauma from the experience of war. Further, such structural and cultural violence often exacerbates 
the root causes of violence and inhibits sustainable peace. 
Others have suggested that I claim anyone who uses just war theories to assess war are trying 
to “prepare” for or “seek a just war.”58 This is not an accurate portrayal of my position. It is 
normally governments that directly prepare for “just wars.” My position is that too often when we 
utilize just war theories to assess wars, we risk signaling to others the possibility of a just war 
whether we intend to or not, and whether we are arguing against a specific war or not. This provides 
cultural legitimization that functions in a society and a government to generate mental, emotional, 
material, and institutional resources to prepare for the possibility of a just war. For instance, 
international relations scholar Helen Dexter argues that this discourse of “just war theory” has 
“made it increasingly difficult to oppose war.”59  
Whether we intend it or not, our collective moral imagination for nonviolence gets truncated 
through the cultural legitimation of war and the cultural violence mentioned above. Some scholars 
have responded to this by expanding their personal imagination and then using it to further develop 
a just war framework.60 However, I am not saying that any imagination is limited by utilizing the 
just war approach. I am referring to the moral imagination for the adequate range of nonviolent 
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possibilities, and more precisely the collective moral imagination more so than the personal 
imagination.61 
Rather than “providing no evidence,” as some have claimed,62 for how this limiting of 
nonviolence has been playing out in the Catholic community and beyond, I and others, such as Fr. 
Francisco de Roux, S.J., of Colombia, have offered several examples.63 For instance, too many 
spend little if any time trying to imagine how to humanize or illuminate the dignity of our enemies, 
which is a Gospel mandate and essential to overcoming mass violence. We rarely hear religious 
and political leaders speak about or promote nonviolent resistance, especially boycotts, strikes, 
and civil disobedience, etc., to injustice and violence. When Pope Francis said not to “bomb or 
make war” on ISIS, most U.S. Catholic press and many political/religious leaders left out this 
phrase. They fixated on his call “to stop the aggression” and claimed an openness from the Pope 
to some military action, focusing their discussion on how much. Instead, the Catholic community 
may have better faced the call to not “bomb or make war” by working together to identify creative, 
nonviolent responses. Another example is how the depth and range of education on nonviolent 
theory and practice is much better in most Mennonite or Quaker schools compared to most 
Catholic institutions. 
We could look in recent history to see more evidence for how this framework has functioned to 
limit nonviolent potential by Catholic leaders. U.S. leaders, such as the United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), limited nonviolent imagination and options by supporting the war 
in Vietnam as a “just war” during the 1960s.64 In the Gulf War of 1991, U.S. Catholic leaders, 
including bishops, offered various positions despite the criticism of Pope John Paul II. For 
example, Cardinal Bernard Law expressed clear support for the war effort. The lack of a consistent 
message too often enabled the status quo and the subsequent cycles of violence that continued 
twenty-five years later through destructive economic sanctions and further war in Iraq. Additional 
examples also exist.65 
Although the turn to a just peace ethic would significantly enhance our nonviolent imagination, 
development, and commitment, some argue that this ethic simply increases the threshold for last 
resort and thus should simply fit within the broader just war framework. Yes, it would to some 
extent increase the space for nonviolent action; however, Cahill argues that attempts to incorporate 
just peace components into a just war framework in our present context of continued violence 
“opens the door to ‘just peace’ as a more adequate way to respond to military and societal violence 
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than the application of just war theory, both from a Christian and from a political or humanistic 
standpoint.”66 Further, when placing a just peace ethic within the just war framework it would also 
get co-opted in a way that continues to perpetuate many of the other previously discussed social 
and political problems too often enabled by the just war framework. Not to mention that many of 
the just peace norms, such as reflexivity, virtues of mercy and empathy, conflict transformation, 
human dignity, etc., are inconsistent with just war logic. There are, of course, some positive 
elements in the just war tradition that should be and are incorporated and transformed in the process 
of shifting to a just peace ethic, such as right intention, just cause, accountability, and preventing 
and reducing violence.67 Perhaps as a signal to the broader church, Lisa Cahill points out that the 
modern popes “clearly envision their role as Christian leaders and teachers, not as elaborating 
justifications of armed force, but as maximizing the visibility, appeal, uniting power, and 
effectiveness of nonviolence and just peace.”68 
 
Conclusion 
In this essay, I offered an example of how a nonviolent just peace ethic could contribute to the 
transformation and trans-armament of military institutions. Reflecting on how such trans-
armament relates to re-imagining protection mechanisms in the light of the Eucharist, I offered a 
brief inquiry into the case of the Rwandan civil war and the genocide of 1994. In light of this 
potential for nonviolence, I responded to some recent discourse around the just war framework to 
help create more space for the Church embodying a sacramental imagination of nonviolence. The 
central argument is that if the Catholic Church commits to offering a sacramental imagination of 
nonviolence to the world, then the Church will not only get closer to becoming a church of mercy 
and a sacrament of nonviolence,68 but we will more effectively transform our military institutions 
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